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The Social in Thought and Practice
In Economy of Force (2015) , Patricia Owens has produced original scholarship of the first order. She recovers the discourse of household rule which has informed modern social thought. Readers of Security Dialogue, and those who work in Critical Security Studies, will find her work of special interest. International Relations (IR) scholars have typically turned to social theory as a source of critical insight, for leverage in an intellectually and politically conservative discipline. Security Dialogue has been an important forum for such work, where disciplines influenced by social theory, from sociology to political economy, have been brought to bear on questions of security. Owens, by contrast, lays bare the hidden conservative politics behind much social theorizing. For her, social thought seeks to domesticate social disorder.
IR has borrowed a great deal from other disciplines, while offering precious little in return. With this book, Owens pays down a goodly portion of our collective debt. She is able to do so, in part, precisely because IR is an "inter-discipline" able to draw together insights from, and speak to, a range of scholarly traditions. In particular, and almost uniquely among the social sciences, political theory and the history of political thought remain vital subjects in IR. We have not relegated them to a pre-scientific past. Owens' facility with these traditions has led to an argument that demands attention from those engaged in social and historical inquiry, in any discipline. It does so because it is a political theoretic critique of the very possibility 2 of a social science. For once, it will be social and political theorists reading an IR scholar rather than the other way around. Owens must be feted for this achievement.
Her book will initiate debates and new inquiries across many fields.
For Owens, social thought arises in response to insurgency, both among the workers at home and among colonized "natives" abroad. It is concerned with domesticating society, with integrating unruly populations into one form or another of household rule. Social thought is a kind of counter-insurgency manual for social workers and imperial soldiers. Owens claims we cannot understand the development of modern social thought apart from this "Social Question." This question conjoins industrializing Europe with its colonies as two sites of disorder.
Empire becomes essential to the trajectory of social theory. Owens links the social to the imperial, joining those scholars who have exposed its constitutive role in areas of modern thought (Chakrabarty 2000; Chatterjee 2012; Mehta 1999; Said 1979; 1993; Zimmerman 2010 ).
Owens develops an important implication of this imbrication of social theory with insurgency and empire. Insurgencies and disorder become major moments in the development of the social sciences. It is not just that scholars are called upon to assist the work of empire, from designing the census in British India to the Strategic Hamlet in Vietnam. Social unrest, suicide and anomie, workers' strikes and revolutionary peasants, incite, generate, and frame social theorizing and its historical trajectories. Owens argues that social thought embodies "conservative moral categories" that respond to social unrest with a politics of domestication (85).
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Concepts like community, authority, and alienation appear as basic sociological categories. But they reflect a desire for integration and order in the face of the social upheaval generated by capitalism and empire.
Integration into what? For Owens, social thought mistakes society for a wellordered household. An ancient Greek oikos or a feudal estate was organized around the administration of life necessities, in a hierarchy ruled by a patriarch. Everyone had a place according to their gender, status, caste, race, or other social attribute (8).
Running a productive household was an art, and modernity made it into a science:
sociology. "Distinctly social thought is . . . the science of household management, the science of how to rule over-de-politicise-populations." (87) Modern society is conceived as a scaled-up and bureaucratically administered household. Modernity did not destroy household rule, but transformed it. Social thought functions ideologically, obscuring the reality of household politics. Owens re-describes the familiar Eurocentric and stadial model of ancient, feudal, early modern, and modern eras as a succession of forms of household rule (chap. 3). Governance, at home and in the colonies, sought to order populations by status around the production and administration of life necessities. Unruliness was domesticated.
Part of the task of the critical reception of Economy of Force will be to determine the limits and significances of its arguments. Owens uncovers a genealogy of modern social thought. She shows how household thinking and politics inform a range of social categories and theories. This is hugely significant. But she goes on to claim that the entirety of social theorizing, any use of "the social" as an explanatory concept, is invalidated by its household genealogy (286). Of social theories and theorists, Owens writes, "None of them are convincing in light of the history and ontology of households" (287).
As part of her polemic, Owens chides social theory for its depth metaphors, for the idea of the social and society as the source of the "really real," of social relations as explanations for social and political phenomena (chap. 2). But what difference does it make to re-describe modern society and politics as scaled-up, bureaucratically administered households? For Owens, for example, nation-states are "a distinctively modern and bureaucratic social form of household rule." (88) (89) This kind of claim is considerably different than the idea that a discourse of household politics informs social theorizing. It is to suggest that the "really real" is be found in, and only in, households. Here, Owens mistakes her genealogical argument about social theory with a social and political account of modernity, one that threatens to be totalizing. Uncovering a discourse of household politics in social theory is a different matter than determining how that discourse informed actual, historical practices of governance or counterinsurgency. Owens claims both, but establishes only the first.
One reason Owens' re-description of modern politics and society as household rule is less successful is that it seems to leave much of what we know about modernity-from social theorists-intact. For example, Owens demonstrates how Foucault's potted history of the discovery of population mistakenly imagines the family has been eradicated as a model of government (34). She is surely right; 5 models of governance continued to draw on the household imaginary. But in saying this imaginary was scaled-up and bureaucratized, placed in the hands of experts dedicated to the reproduction of life and life's necessities, Owens underlines rather than undermines biopolitics as a useful conceptual frame for inquiry. Similarly, in emphasizing the bureaucratic and capitalist dimensions of modern household rule, Owens does not seem to depart far from what the Weberian and Marxian traditions have to teach us about bureaucracy and capitalism. Presumably, analysis and research into household rule would draw in large measure from histories and sociologies of landed estates, patrimonialism, and so on, well-trodden ground for social theory. To show that a household politics lies at the origins of modern social theory and has shaped its development, is to discover something very important we did not realize about social thought. To seek to reduce inquiry into politics and society to the critique of households is another matter.
In effect, there is a slippage between genealogy and ontology in Economy of Force; between household rule as a discourse and as a reality in politics and society.
Owens ultimately comes down on the latter (286-87), but she is at her most incisive and effective in respect of the former, where her big contribution is to be found. My remaining, critical remarks address some of the consequences of this slippage. European officers and many Indian soldiers were aware the rumor was untrue.
Some officers let their soldiers make up their own cartridges to prove the point. But the rumor still exercised a social effect, driving a wedge between European officers and Indian soldiers. As some of the soldiers explained to their officers, they could not be seen to use the cartridges because their families and their communities believed the rumors. It would be thought they had broken their caste and violated their religion; that is, they would be stigmatized, to use a typically "social" concept (Kaye 1864: 553-59; Palmer 1966: 6) . The greased cartridges myth in the events of 1857 and its construction in various discourses about 1857 are two different matters, requiring different forms of research and analysis. One approach is to study the social effects of the rumor in 1857; another is to study its place in colonial discourse.
The two kinds of inquiry should not be confused.
The point is not that Owens gets 1857 wrong. She should not have got herself in the position of offering an account of it (or her other counterinsurgent cases) as an historical event, as somehow really about utilitarians and households. In doing so she fudges the relationship between knowledge and practice, text and event, offers no convincing account of it, and ends up privileging textual constructs rather than social and historical research. This would not have been a problem if Economy of Force remained at the level of genealogy. It is a problem as soon as one claims that the really real of modern society and politics is to be found in households, and that we know this because there is a hidden discourse of household politics in the texts of social theorists and counterinsurgents. Nowhere in Economy of Force is there anything that looks like a historical sociology of household rule or warfare, something that shows that interpretations of historical events that do not take household politics seriously are wrong. Owens' strengths in reading texts and her mastery of intellectual history establishes the genealogy of "social thought," not the role it played in structures and events.
At some level Owens recognizes this problem: "There is no direct correlation between the conduct of counterinsurgency and the prevailing government ideology of the counterinsurgent state; any suggestion that counterinsurgents consciously seek to apply particular social theories must be heavily qualified. " (2015: 248) 
